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10 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

ATTENTION : Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT : Assessment of Studies

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1. You have asked for a CS evaluation of three studies made by in 1952, with particular emphasis on the extent to which they have been used and have influenced our operations, and whether now, by hindsight, we would have recommended expenditure of CIA funds for their production.

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2. My evaluation is as follows:

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[Redacted content]

** You may recall that the Director of* SECRET


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thought this was a "terrific" job.

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3. These assessments of past projects are useful in evaluating [] but past history, although an obviously important element of an evaluation, does not give a fair picture of what [] can do in the future. Nor are these reviews of the individual worth of past projects adequate criteria unless they are related to the general criticisms we have of [] and the correctives we are applying.

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4. Criticisms of [] are generally two:

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a. [] progressively enlarges the area of its research until the research becomes unmanageable for them and too formidable for us to absorb.

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b. [] studies contain too little detailed facts and too much broad generalization to be of more than marginal use to the operating elements under DD/P. [] sights, in my opinion, are too high.

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5. What are the correctives: As for point 4 (a), I believe that much of the criticism should be leveled at CIA's inconsistent positions vis-a-vis [] and our failure to spell out precise terms of reference for, and to monitor on a continuing basis the [] projects which we have requested or authorized, rather than [] itself. [] conceives his mission to be the inquiry into subjects which are of common concern to all the member agencies of the NSC, rather than of specific concern to CS, or even to CIA. Agency policy has at times encouraged him in this concept. In consequence, [] studies are oriented to the PSB and to the NSC, and not to CS. A recent illustration is the PRC's instruction that [] be coordinated with the USAF on the chance that USAF might want to add subjects for inquiry to satisfy its own independent needs. PRC furthermore prescribed that [] be monitored by DD/I rather than by DD/P, who had originated it, thus further removing it into the area of common (rather than operational) concern.

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** or, better, too broad
and all inclusive.*

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6. The practical consequence of this policy is that the terms of reference drawn up by the original sponsor of the study, such as myself, are gradually buried within the terms of reference added by other interested agencies. The resulting research product satisfies none of them because it has attempted to satisfy all of them. Sometime soon the Agency as a whole must resolve these two opposite viewpoints: one day it encourages the concept that [] serves the common strategic concerns of the total NSC community, and the next day it stresses the application of research to the tactical interests of the case officer and field operators. Both concepts have merit, but they cannot operate in harness. Certainly a project which has been targeted at a strategic IAC interest should not be weighed in terms of its direct benefit in a tactical operation.

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7. As for the general criticism note under 4 (b) above, it has been my experience that the only useful research in government has been where the unit requesting the research was an active partner in the process. Informed individuals representing the Government interest must sit down with individuals representing the contract research to work out the precise research problems to which the government needs an answer and for which the researchers can provide an answer. The working relationship between the researcher and the ultimate user of his product then must continue. The need for continuing liaison was amply illustrated by the defects of []

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8. [] was conceived to undertake "research projects in the general field of psychological, political and economic warfare". Unfortunately, PP operations have lacked sufficient basic facts about the science of communication and sufficient confirmation of their working assumptions to be able to play with confidence the role of active partnership that is necessary for successful research. I am convinced, however, that numerous areas of useful research will be obtained from [] (such as the two studies now underway). I

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would deplore anything that would permit [] to fall apart or be placed in a position where its research facilities were no longer available for PP use. In saying this I am not disagreeing with the negative conclusion we have reached on the projects you have asked be assessed. These assessments, however, address themselves to the past efforts of [] while I am speaking exclusively of the future.

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FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director, Plans

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